THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Future Interests-Trust for Accumulation-Rule against Perpetuities Applied to Testamentary Memorial Trust Fund-[Florida].-The plaintiffs' testatrix devised the bulk of her estate to the plaintiff trust company, in trust for
the creation and preservation of a memorial fund in honor of her deceased husband and brothers. One-half the annual net income of the fund was to be invested in substantial investments for the purposes of the fund, and the other
half was to be given in fixed proportions to nine designated charities.' The entire trust was designed to exist forever, and its sole purpose seems to have been
to generate income for the annual gifts to the charitable beneficiaries. In a suit
by the trustee and the executor for specific instructions as to their legal duties
under the will, the trial court held that the trust was charitable and might continue indefinitely under the control and supervision of a court of equity. On
appeal to the Florida Supreme Court by some of the heirs and residuary devisees, held, that since the primary intention of the testatrix was not charitable,
but rather the creation and preservation of the memorial fund in perpetuity,
the creation of the fund violated the common law rule against perpetuities and
the former adjudications of the court, and that the illegality of the fund carried
with it and rendered void the bequests to the charitable organizations. Porter
2
v. Baynard.
Much of our property law has evolved from a long struggle between landowners and the courts, the former endeavoring to contrive means of controlling
the use and enjoyment of property for generations after their death, and the
courts seeking to insure to each present generation the right to full enjoyment,
possession, and power of disposition of the property it holds.3 To prevent this
fettering of property, a number of rules have been evolved by the courts. However, these rules frequently have not been adequately distinguished, nor have
the reasons behind them been adequately stated and differentiated, with the
result that much confusion currently exists as to their nature and application.
seizure. But to do so would necessitate an added judicial determination of whether a given
statute is "substantive" or "ministerial"--a determination which may involve the same difficulties as the classification of a statute as "substantive" or "procedural."
I Over half of the 502-page record of the case was concerned with the problem of whether one
of the beneficiaries, the Theosophical Society, was a religious organization entitled to be considered a charity. The court, although it discussed the nature of a charitable trust in the
abstract, failed to apply explicitly the fruits of its discussion. In reaching the conclusion that
the trust is not charitable, the court did not indicate whether it was the memorial fund or the
nature of the beneficiaries, or both, which rendered the trust non-charitable. However, in
discussing the effect of the illegality of the trust fund on the gifts to the beneficiaries, the
court conceded, arguendo, that the beneficiaries were charitable. The trustee petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, claiming that the real basis for the decision
was the Florida court's feeling that the beneficiaries were not legitimate charities, and that
the decision operated as a deprivation of religious liberty. See the trustee's brief on petition
for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
' 28 So. 2d 89o (Fla., 1946), cert. den. sub nom. Union Trust v. Genau, 67 S. Ct. io85
(

C947)7

3 Cheshire, Modern Law of Real Property 468-70 (1944)-

RECENT CASES

The modern era of the development of these rules began with the rule against
perpetuities. The modern rule is stated solely in terms of the vesting of future
interests within a period of lives in being and twenty-one years,4 having been
created to meet the ingenuity of the conveyancers, who discovered that under
the Statute of Uses an indestructible future interest might be created,5 enabling
property owners to decree devolution of their property into the distant future.
This made it possible for the ultimate ownership of property to remain unsettled
for long periods of time, and it was believed that this tended to tie up property
in a legally or practically inalienable condition throughout these periods.' The
rule against perpetuities was for the most part adequate to meet this need because it effectively limited the period during which this uncertainty of ownership might continue.
But because the rule was concerned solely with the vesting of future interests
it was inapplicable to the problems created by the advent of those modem
trusts in which all interests vested within the permitted period.7 Under these
trusts, it was possible for property to be conveyed to designated trustees who
were to manage the property to insure the specified enjoyment by the designated beneficiaries, and the law had no weapons with which to control the period of time during which this divison of interests in the property might continue.
It is not clear why the courts were concerned about limiting the duration of the
trust.$ The earliest cases merely stated that the trust of indefinite duration
was void as a "perpetuity," without any discussion as to what perpetuities were
or why they were evils.9 Objections to the perpetual trust are still crystallizing,
but they seem to be centered about the notions that the trust of indefinite duration effectively restricts the alienability of the property involved, and that it
unreasonably deprives the beneficiary of full enjoyment of the property.
It is clear that where the trustee or the cestui is prohibited by the terms of the
trust from transferring his respective interest, common law sentiments regard4 "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest." Gray, Rule against Perpetuities § 2oi

(1942).

s Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 59 o (x620).
6 Gray, op. cit. supra note 4, at §§ 1ig,

121.5, 121.7; 2

Simes, Law of Future Interests

H6 477-80 (1936); 4 Rest., Property 2123-33 (1944).
.7 Story v. First National Bank and Trust Co., II5 Fla. 436, 156 So. ioi (1934); Gray,
op. cit. supra note 4, at § 232; i Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 214 (1935); 1 Tiffany, Law of
Real Property § 396-97 (1939).
8Mere duration of interests in property, without more, has not troubled the courts. The
most obvious example of the perpetual interest is the fee simple absolute. Leaseholds of
indefinite or perpetual duration have been freely allowed. Monbar, Inc. v. Monaghan, 18 Del.

Ch. 395, 162 Atl. 50 (1932); Columbia Ry. Gas and Electric Co. v. Jones, ii 9 S.C. 480, X12

S.E. 267 (1921); Crowe v. Wilson, 65 Md. 479, 5 Atl. 427 (1886). Similarly, divided interests
in the form of easements and profits have been permitted to exist without definite limits on
their duration. 2 Simes, op. cit. supra note 6, at § og.
9Thomson v. Shakespeare, i De. G. F. &J. 399 (i86o); Came v. Long, 2 De. G. F. &J. 75
(i86o).
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ing free alienability are offended.Io However, there has also been objection to
those trusts in which the parties are fully empowered to convey their interests,"
and it has been effectively argued that the very division of the trust into legal
and equitable parts makes the trust interests unattractive to potential purchasers. 2 Consequently, the trust is said to operate as an indirect restraint on
alienation. The objection to the trust of indefinite duration might be adequately
explained by this line of argument were it not that the courts have gone one
step further in striking down trusts in which all interests were vested, in which
all parties were fully authorized to convey their interests, and in which the
trust property involved no tangibles, but rather a sum of wealth in the form of
money or near-monies.' 3 The concept of alienability has usually been invoked
to prevent the fettering of individual units of property rather than to achieve
fluidity or greater velocity in the circulation of property.' 4 Nevertheless, it
seems possible that even where there is only a segment of wealth involved, and
there cannot possibly be the traditional forms of restraints on alienation, the
fact that a trstee is handling the wealth will have inhibitory effects upon expenditures and investments, producing results akin to those produced by the
traditional restraints. Unless this rationalization can be accepted, it would appear that the policy of eliminating restraints on alienation is not sufficient to
explain the bases for limitations on the duration of private trusts.' s
Undue postponement of the cestui's enjoyment of the legal estate is much
more promising as a rationale of the objections to the perpetual trust.' 6 The law

has always sought to guarantee to those who have an exclusive, indefeasible
interest in property the fullest possible enjoyment of the property, and the trust
necessarily involves the limitation of the cestui's enjoyment to such as the
settlor has directed. It has been strongly felt that the cestui who has an exclusive, indefeasible right to the enjoyment of the trust property should not be
required to limit his present enjoyment, but should be allowed to use and dis10See

i Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 220.

tIbid.,

at § 218.

12Ibid.; 2 Simes, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 553; Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary
Trusts, 43 Yale L.J. 393 (i934).
13 It appears to be difficult for the authorities in this field to recognize the possibility of
absolute separation of the enjoyment of property from its ownership. In this connection, it
has been suggested that interests involved in this type of trust represent a new system of property tenure resembling the situation found in the modem corporation, in which the shareholders
possess beneficial interests in the corporation's economic assets without actual possession or
control of the assets. Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary Trusts, 43 Yale L. J. 393, at 397 n.
i8 (x934); Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1932).

'4

Gertman v. Berdick, 123 F. 2d 9 24 , 926 (App. D.C., 1941).

15Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 218.
6
Ibid.; Gray, op. cit. supra note 4, at §§
(1920).

121-21.8;

Kales, Future Interests, §§

732-38
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pose of the property as he wishes at the earliest possible time.7 This objection
to the indefinite duration of the trust seems to be universally applicable to the
cases involved in the problem, and it is believed that it has been a consideration of at least equal importance to the objections based on inalienability, in
the development of the rule or rules limiting the duration of the private trust.
Some jurisdictions apparently have reached the conclusion that a trust of
indefinite duration, without more, need not be prohibited, 8 but the weight of
authority is inclined to establish definite limits to the life of the private trust.
The precise nature of the rules developed in the United States is obscure because
of confusion as to the reasons behind the rules,9 and a tendency incorrectly to
invoke the rule against perpetuities to solve the problem, as in the instant case.
In England a clear-cut solution has been reached by permitting the cestui who
has exclusive and indefeasible interests in the trust, and who is sui juris, to demand the conveyance of the legal estate to himself at any timeY° There is no
problem of the perpetual trust because there is no indestructible trust. Most
American jurisdictions have followed the opposite holding, a's expressed in
Claflin v. Claflin'21 and have refused to violate the settlor's intent by permitting
the premature destruction of the trust by the cestui. But these very jurisdictions have developed rules limiting the duration of trusts, the majority rule
appearing to be that a private trust may be created to last for a period of lives
in being and twenty-one years only.22 This period having been chosen by analo-

gy to the perpetuity rule period,23 there has been considerable confusion of the
two rules,'4 this confusion being based upon the similarity of the time periods
'7See Saunders v. Vautier, Cr. and Ph. 240 (x841); In re Couturier, [19071 i Ch. 470;
Huber v. Donoghue, 49 N.J. Eq. 125, 23 Atl. 495 (1892); Rector v. Dalby, 98 Mo. App. i89,
71 S.W. 1078 (i9o3); Story v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, I56 So. ioi

(I934).

1SO'Rourke v. Beard, i5, Mass. 9, 23 N.E. 576 (i8go); Baker v. Stem, 194 Wis. 233, 216
N.W. 147 (1927); Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359,36 Atl. 635 (1896).
19"Restraints on use and enjoyment have nothing to do with restraints on the right of
alienation. It is true that property subject to such a restriction may be less marketable and
bring a smaller price. It is, nevertheless, freely. alienable in the absence of any restriction to
the contrary ..... These several incidents of ownership must be carefully distinguished. As
the restrictions are against the policy of the law they are to be strictly construed, and no case
can be found deciding that a restraint on one interest has any effect on the other. The right
of enjoyment, however, has been confused with the right of alienation." Foulke, Treatise on
the Rules against Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienation, and Restraints on Enjoyment § 486
(909).
20 Saunders v. Vautier, Cr. and Ph. 24o (r841). Of course, if there are several beneficiaries
who together have an exclusive and indefeasible interest, they may join to terminate the trust.
21r49 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (I889).
-Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (i9o8); Davis v. Rossi, 326 Mo. 9i1, 34 S.W. 2d 8 (i93o);
O'Hare v. Johnston, 273 Ill. 458, 113 N.E. 127 (i916); see also i Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7,
at § 218; 2 Simes, op. cit. supra note 6.
23Kales, op. cit. supra note i6, at § x83; i Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 218.
24Bigelow v. Cady, 171 Ill. 229, 48 N.E. 974 (1897); Siedler v. Syms, 56 N.J. Eq. 275, 38
Atl. 424 (1897); Williams v. Herrick, xg R.I. 197, 32 AUt. 913 (1895); Barnum v. Barnum,
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involved, the resemblance between the perpetual trust and the unbarrable fee
tail, which first bore the name "perpetuity,'25 and the fact that both rules are

said to be concerned with the prevention of inalienability of property.26 This
confusion has been unfortunate in that courts have tended to apply a mechanical rule of lives in being plus twenty-one years to the duration of trusts, without
regard to the actual nature of the interests involved, and have been prone to
void ab initio any trust created to endure beyond the permitted period, destroying all interests of the designated beneficiaries in favor of the heirs at law of the
settlor.27 Although it is believed that the courts may be justified in reaching the
conclusion that the duration of the trust should be limited, the complete destruction of the trust and of the beneficiaries' interests thereunder seems unduly
harsh. The English rule seems preferable because it limits the period during
which property may be held inalienable, and at the same time accelerates
rather than destroys the beneficiaries' enjoyment. The American rule has been
applied even when inalienability has not been apparent, and has eliminated
whatever restraints there might be only at the expense of violating the settlor's
intent and the beneficiaries' expectations. It is submitted that whatever goals
the courts may have in mind might be more equitably achieved either by accepting the English rule or by permitting the trust to run for the permitted
period and then making it destructible at the instance of the beneficiaries.' 8 It
is believed that the only justification for the American rule as applied in extreme form by the Florida court in the instant case is that it is consistent with
the rule against perpetuities.29 While consistency of these rules is perhaps de26 Md. rig (1866); but see Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 Atl. 1094 (194), which reversed a long line of Maryland decisions beginning with the Barnum case, by holding that the
rule against perpetuities relates only to the commencement, and not to the duration, of an
interest.
25 1 Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 218.
16Professor Simes believes that the rule against indefinite duration of trusts may be considered to be a branch of the perpetuities rule, because both are designed to minimize indirect
restraints on alienation. 2 Simes, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 553.
17 1 Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 218; see Bigelow v. Cady, 171 Ill. 229, 48 N.E. 974
(1897); Siedler v. Syms, 56 N.J. Eq. 275,38 Atl. 424 (1897); Williams v. Herrick, 19 R.I. 197,
32 At. 913 (i895); but see Simes, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 557.
2 Another way of stating the same conclusion is that the duration of trusts should be
subject only to internal attack (by the beneficiaries to accelerate their own enjoyment) and
never to external attack (by strangers to the trust seeking to void the entire trust). Cleary,
op. cit. supra note 13.
29 The discussion is based upon acceptance of the Florida court's holding in the instant
case that the trust is dominantly private. This holding greatly complicates the problem because it has been uniformly held that a perpetual charitable trust is valid. 2 Bogert, op. cit.
supra note 7, at § 352; 2 Simes, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 554. The court's view is probably
founded upon the belief that the testatrix provided for only one-half of the annual income to
go to the charities, while the other one-half was to be reinvested in the trust corpus in order
to create a tremendous concentration of wealth bearing her family names, of which society
would be forced to take notice. This interpretation seems greatly strained. So far as can be
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sirable, the attempt to achieve consistency by expansion of doctrines based on
public policy far beyond the actual requirements of that policy is not sound.
It is unfortunate that the court in the instant case did not state the grounds
for its decision more clearly. Although its holding is worded in terms of the rule
against perpetuities, the actual basis for its decision may be the antipathy of
the court to the provision for accumulation of one-half the annual income in
perpetuity. The problem of the accumulation can exist only where there are no
rules limiting the duration of the trust or where the period during which courts
will permit accumulations is shorter than that during which they will permit a
trust to endure, because a limitation upon the duration of a trust automatically
limits the period of accumulation.3 Furthermore, the objections to trusts for
accumulation are identical to objections to trusts of indefinite duration, except
that there is a possible additional objection to the accumulation, based upon the
social and economic evils purportedly arising from the potentially tremendous
concentration of wealth in what amounts to a "dead hand."'3 Almost all jurisdetermined from the instrument itself, the sole purpose of the. memorial fund was to generate
income for the charitable gifts. In construing the nature of a trust as charitable or private,
the court does not look to the motive or intention of the settlor, but rather only to the net
results of the trust in action. 2 Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 364. Similar provisions in
wills have been examined by the Florida courts and by those of other jurisdictions, and no
case has been found holding that provision for accumulation of half the income indicates an
intent by the settlor to create a private memorial of the trust fund. See Pelton v. First Trust
and Savings Bank, 98 Fla. 748, 124 So. i69 (1929); Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134
N.E. 276 (1922); St. Paul's Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N.E. 231 (1895).
30 Accumulations of Income at Common Law, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 839 (1941); Simes, Statutory Restrictions on Income Accumulation, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 409 (1940).
31In Hillyard v. Miller, 1o Pa. 326, 336 (x849), Gibson, J., was fearful that a perpetual
accumulation "would ultimately draw into its vortex all the property in the state." The ambiguity of most courts in handling the accumulation problem possibly reflects anxiety in
dealing with potentially astronomical sums. Surprisingly enough, most accumulations which
have slipped through the courts have proved to be dismal failures. See Leach, Cases on Future
Interests 802 (1935), for the story of the Thellusson accumulation. In the trust involved in
Moeller v. Kautz, 112 Conn. 481, 152 Atl. 886 (1931), a trust fund of $i,ooo,ooo yielded in
fifteen years a total accumulation of only $350,000, with the annual net income tending to
drdp progressively. Despite the nightmares mathematicians may conjure up with compound
interest tables, there has been remarkably little attempt by economists to analyze the precise
effects of vast accumulations on the economy, or the possible "automatic controls" the
economy might throw into action to check or neutralize the effects of the accumulation.
In an elaborate brief, counsel in Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F. 2d 924 (App. D.C., 1941), attempted to convince the court that economic considerations demanded that the particular
accumulation be barred, but despite attempts to show deleterious effects of the accumulation
upon government financing and consumer purchasing power, no arguments beyond superficial conjecture were presented. The court pointed out in its decision that we are not sufficiently versed in economic cause and effect to know precisely what will lead us to prosperity,
and that the problem remains one for the legislature. Nor is the typical accumulation necessarily a Fort Knox or "dead hand." As long as the funds of the trust are being expended in
some form of investment they are serving economically useful purposes, and the courts
need not be concerned with weighing the relative value to society of an overcoat purchased
by the beneficiary as compared with corporate or government securities purchased by the
trustee. Ibid., 933.
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dictions32 have established by statute33 or decision rules limiting the period
during which accumulations may continue, the prevailing rule established by
the courts being the period of lives in being plus twenty-one years.3 4 However,
the courts have been much more liberal in dealing with provisions for accumulation than in handling the problem of the perpetual trust, in their tendency to
void accumulation provisions only as to the excess, and to use a cy pres doctrine
to effectuate the settlor's intent so far as possible.35 This is especially true in
cases involving an accumulation for charitable purposes, in which the accumulation has generally been permitted to continue without definite time limita6
tion, subject to the supervision and control of a court of equity.3 It is significant that the Florida Supreme Court in the instant case completely ignored the
question of the accumulation, which was certainly the most objectionable feature of the trust, in order to base its decision upon the rule against perpetuities
under which the court was able to destroy the whole trust arrangement without
the embarrassment of attempting to analyze the accumulation provisions
quantitatively and of applying cy pres doctrines to preserve as much of the trust
as possible.37
The Florida court's decision in this case marks a long step35 in the direction
-12The common law had no rule against accumulations. Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves.

227

(1799), 11 Ves. 112 (i8o5); i Bogert, op. ct. supra note 7, at § 215.
33 Thirteen states have adopted statutes limiting accumulations. The general trend of
legislation is to broaden the exceptions to the restrictions on accumulations. See Simes,
Statutory Restrictions on Income Accumulation, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 409 (1940).
34Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F. 2d 924 (App. D.C., 1941); Moeller v. Kautz, 112 Conn. 481,
152 At. 886 (1931); i Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 215.
3sGaess v. Gaess, 132 Conn. 96, 42 A. 2d. 796 (i941); Hussey v. Sargeant, xi6 Ky. 53,
75 S.W. 211 (i9o3). It-would seem that the accumulation, being further removed from the rule
against perpetuities than is the perpetual trust, is much less likely to receive mechanical
treatment. The courts seem to realize that the objection is merely quantitative, and attempt
to analyze quantitatively the fact situation resulting from the accumulation trust.
36Authorities cited note 29 supra. "No trust has been found where provision for an accumulation for charity has been held void." 2 Simes, op. cit. supra note 6, § 591 at 5ig. See
also St. Paul's Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N.E. 231 (i895); Tincher v.
Arnold, i47 Fed. 665 (C.C.A. 7th, x9o6); Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 Atl. 896 (1893);
Quinn v. Peoples Trust and Savings Co., 223 Ind. 317, 6o N.E. 2d 281 (1945).

37 Courts frequently strain the construction of the trust instrument to avoid quantitative
analysis of the duration aspects. It is highly probable that the court in the instant case ignored
the accumulation issue because it would be much more difficult to call the trust an accumulation for private purposes than a trust for private purposes, especially in view of the tradition of
attempting to effectuate the settlor's intent in the accumulation cases.
38 Powers of testamentary disposition have been steadily expanding in Anglo-American
law, but at the same time restrictions have been imposed limiting the control which testators
may exercise over future generations. Scott, Control of Property by the Dead, 65 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 527, 632 (1917). The courts have long been urged to take bold steps in the direction of limiting the testator's control over future generations. 4o Col. L. Rev. 143o (i94o),
noting Burdick v. Burdick, 33 F. Supp. 921 (Dist. Col., i94o). Vinson, J., in Gertman v.
Burdick, 123 F. 2d 924 (App. D.C., 1941), vigorously refused to take such a step by limiting
the duration of an accumulation to less than lives in bqng plus twenty-one years, on the
ground that the courts are ill-equipped to solve these problems in a manner conducive to
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of eliminating control by the dead, and many will regard this as a wise move.
However, it is believed that since the law permits testamentary dispositions of
property, and permits settlors to dispose of their property through trust arrangements, the rules of law which have been established to limit their powers
should be carefully defined and scrupulously observed by the courts.3 9 The
limitations within which one may pass his property.to future generations should
be primarily matters for legislative determination, since the subject is intimately connected with deep-seated notions about the nature of our economic
and social structures. Where necessity has caused the courts to create their own
rules, they should be applied with understanding as to the nature of the rules,
in order that formalization of the concepts will not cause interference by the
courts with otherwise valid and socially unobjectionable property dispositions.4o

Insurance-Exclusion Clauses-Airplane Passenger Not Engaged in "Aeronautical Flight"-[Federal].-The plaintiff was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued to her husband in 1928. The policy contained a provision for
double indemnity if the death of the insured resulted from an accident, provided
it did not result "from an aeronautical flight."' The insured was killed when the
airplane in which he was a passenger crashed. The defendant paid the face value
of the policy, but denied further liability. The plaintiff then brought an action to
recover the additional indemnity. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of the district of Columbia, held, the death of the insured was not a result of an "aeronautical flight" within the meaning of the clause excluding liability. Summary
judgment for defendant reversed. Clapper v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.2
orderly development in the law. In placing the matter squarely before the legislature, he
pointed out that apparently only thirteen legislatures have thought the problem serious
enough to warrant legislation.
39 The Florida Court in the instant case has gone far beyond, and contrary to, its previous
holdings. In Pelton v. First Trust and Savings Bank, 98 Fla. 748, z24 So. 164 (1929), it was
held that a trust to pay one-half the annual income to charity, and to accumulate the other
half in perpetuity, was void as to the accumulation, but the gift of annual income to the
charity was sustained. In Story v. First National Bank and Trust Co., ii5 Fla. 436, 156 So.
101 (1934), the court held that a private trust created to run beyond the perpetuity

period is

not void, that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to the duration of trusts, and that
the effect of an invalid restraint on alienation is merely to accelerate enjoyment.
40 The power of courts to redefine common law principles in the light of fundamentally
altered conditions, in the absence of legislation, is well established. Funk v. United States,
290 U.S. 371 (2933). But "there is no higher duty which rests upon a court than to carry out
the intentions of a testator when the provision is not repugnant to settled principles of public
policy and is otherwise valid." Shelton v. King, 229 U.S. 90, 101 (193).
I "If the death of the insured occurs ....from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means ....[and] not ....from an aeronautical flight or submarine descent ....the Company will pay ....... Clapper v. Aetna Ins. Co., i57 F. 2d 76

(App. D.C., 2946).
2157
F. 2d 76 (App. D.C., 1946).

